Crash Spurs Investigation of Tactics Designed to Circumvent HOS Rules
Eric Miller
Faced with evolving tactics to bypass hours-of-service rules, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is taking steps to combat electronic logging device fraud. The agency is launching a multipronged approach to address what it describes as a “moving target.”
In particular, the agency cited National Transportation Safety Board concerns with so-called ghost drivers as well as drivers utilizing multiple ELD accounts, and it is exploring various technological requirements to target those specific issues. It also is monitoring ELD performance data, training enforcement personnel to identify and act against fraud, removing noncompliant ELD providers from the market, and updating its ELD rules.
“FMCSA is committed to staying diligent with its fraud prevention efforts,” an agency spokeswoman said in a statement. “FMCSA continues to explore other methods to decrease ELD fraud in both the short and long term.”
A fatal December 2022 crash in Virginia put a spotlight on ELD fraud after a tractor-trailer driver for Illinois-based Triton Logistics was able to — with apparent participation from the carrier — falsify his ELD records to extend his driving time beyond the 11-hour regulatory maximum limit. The truck he was driving during early morning hours along Interstate 64 near Williamsburg, Va., came upon and crashed into a party bus after he failed to take evasive action or brake in time, according to the NTSB investigation. NTSB cited fatigue as a factor in the crash.
“We found that the truck driver’s lack of response to the slow-moving vehicle in his travel lane was due to fatigue from excess driving time and lack of sleep opportunity,” said the NTSB report, recently made public. “The truck’s motor carrier, Triton Logistics, created fictitious driver accounts for some of its vehicles’ electronic logging device systems that enabled drivers to operate beyond federal regulations, creating an opportunity for fatigued driving.”
Three occupants in the party bus died, nine sustained serious injuries, and 11 sustained minor injuries. The truck driver also was seriously injured.
Triton did not return a message left by Transport Topics seeking comment. However, NTSB said the company’s CEO denied knowledge of the fictitious logins and said it conducted internal checks to determine how the incident happened.
The driver detailed the scheme for NTSB investigators. He said whenever he reached his 11-hour limit, he could call the carrier’s HOS department — based in Lithuania — and add the name of a fictitious or former co-driver to the ELD, opening up another 11-hour driving window. If asked by a roadside inspector about the double login, the driver would tell the inspector that he dropped off his co-driver at a truck stop for a family emergency. The driver noted that other drivers used the login scheme to extend time behind the wheel.
After the 2022 crash, FMCSA conducted an on-site review of Triton and issued violations related to drivers making false reports regarding duty status as well as requiring or permitting drivers to extend driving time beyond 11 hours. After the review, FMCSA assigned Triton a conditional safety rating.
With an eye toward remedial action, NTSB concluded that a data-entry tracking history in ELD software could increase accountability and transparency, and also deter motor carrier personnel from making false entries aimed at circumventing HOS regulations. Investigators recommended that FMCSA revise its requirements to require ELD providers to create an audit log that includes the date, driver login time and identity of who logged them in, driver’s license numbers, the names of anyone who edits a log, and any changes to active driver lists. NTSB also recommended that the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance inform its members about the scheme and circumstances surrounding the Williamsburg crash.
Senior NTSB investigator Shawn Currie told Transport Topics if the driver’s name was John, he’d be logged in as Frank and then operate with a new 11-hour HOS time limit. “The hours of service, whether you agree with them or not, are there to prevent drivers from driving in excess of the rules, and to ensure they have the appropriate time off,” Currie said. He noted that the circumstance of the Williamsburg case could result in FMCSA fines and possibly criminal penalties if the state elected to bring charges.
Jeremy Disbrow, a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance roadside inspection specialist, said inspectors encounter false ELD log entries “all day, every day. Of course, many of the false entries can’t be proven, or they go unnoticed.”
He said the issue is known to CVSA inspectors. “We just discussed all this in a conference after the NTSB report came out,” Disbrow said. “It was pretty clear from the inspectors around the country that this isn’t an isolated incident by any means. The average inspector is seeing this every shift, at least once or twice. There’s a number of ways that they’re falsifying [logs].”
This can include simply using tools available on some devices, he said.
“Drivers can make edits,” Disbrow noted. “If a driver makes an edit on the device himself, it will show up as an edit, and a suspicious inspector can see that. But if a carrier in their back office makes the edit, there are instances where it’s been done but doesn’t show up as an edit.”
Disbrow noted it’s risky to publicly discuss the varying methods. “It’s hard to talk about it because I don’t want to give people ideas,” he said. “I don’t want the industry to say, ‘Hey we can try that.’ As the years are going by, people are finding new workarounds. It’s a cat and mouse game.”
He added, “The hours-of-service rules are there to protect everybody. Thwarting them and running an extra five, six, seven hours without adequate rest is absolutely a recipe for fatigue.”
Log falsification is a common and potentially expensive violation, with fines reaching into the thousands of dollars per occurrence. Despite widespread use of electronic logging devices (ELDs), falsification remains a major problem. In fact, it was the second most common violation found during audits last year.
This means you need to look for it, but how? Details from the FMCSA’s audit playbook reveal key methods you can use today.
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Sep 13, 2025, 9:32 AM (7 days ago) |
We must never forget
In the hours following the horrific killing of 31-year-old conservative activist Charlie Kirk on Wednesday, several of his old tweets began circulating on X. One in particular from June of this year is worth meditating on as the country grapples with this tragedy, how we got to this point, and where we go from here.
“When things are moving very fast and people are losing their minds, it’s important to stay grounded,” Kirk wrote on June 17. “Turn off your phone, read scripture, spend time with friends, and remember internet fury is not real life. It’s going to be ok.”
(Reminds me of the CBS early 1950s TV show “Racket Squad” which focused on confidence games and always ending their show with the line, “They will pat you on the back with one hand and pick your pocket with the other.”)
How Bitcoin ATMs Are Helping Scammers Steal Millions
As cryptocurrency machines spread across the country, gas station employees are becoming the unlikely last line of defense against crypto fraud.
Sam Blum
Last month, Avalon Hardy, a gas station clerk at a Stinker Store in Boise, Idaho, noticed something strange. Over the course of a week, three elderly women walked cautiously into the store and headed to a lonely Bitcoin ATM by the front door. The women were always distressed and either talking on the phone or texting with someone who claimed to be owed money that could be paid only with Bitcoin.
The image was disquieting: An old woman, vexed by an unfamiliar machine that took cash deposits and converted it into untraceable cryptocurrency. On all three occasions, the women were carrying bags full of cash. Hardy, noticing all the makings of a scam, decided to intervene. At first, she wasn’t obtrusive. She adopted a boilerplate script: “Do you know where you’re sending the money to?” she’d ask. “You don’t have to be on the phone to send money, as long as you have the other person’s information,” she informed them. Finally, when one 79-year-old victim was adamant about depositing her $15,000, Hardy unplugged the ATM. A week later, Hardy stopped another 75-year-old from losing $19,000.
After Hardy talked to the local cops, she learned that the women were victims of a widespread crypto scam enabled by the proliferation of Bitcoin ATMs, otherwise known as BTMs. There are roughly 30,000 BTMs, mainly run by two major companies Bitcoin Depot and CoinFlip, operating in convenience stores and gas stations across the country. The Stinker Store where Hardy worked hosted a machine from Bitcoin Depot, adding a dose of newfangled finance to the stations’ usual offerings of fuel pumps and fountain sodas, but they’ve also provided a convenient conduit for financial crimes. They turn cash into untraceable digital currencies, which can be transferred to any number of cryptowallets, or perhaps cashed out at an offshore exchange.
The BTM scams usually follow a similar blueprint. First, the scammer messages their mark, often impersonating a government worker or claiming they work for a recognizable company like Microsoft. They claim that they’re collecting on an overdue bill, and tell their victim to pay in Bitcoin, guiding them to a nearby BTM. Sometimes, the social engineering component becomes more sinister, with thieves doctoring fake arrest warrants using AI, Matthew Hogan, a crypto crime specialist with the Connecticut State Police, tells Inc.
“They’ll email you an arrest warrant. And you can tell, once we look at it, obviously, it’s Adobe [Photoshop], but they’ve used AI to enhance it. They’ll take the DOJ logo and throw it on there. They’ll manipulate signatures,” he explains. The end result has all the hallmarks of pulpy true crime, or a suburban nightmare.
All told, Hardy says she’s stopped around seven crypto scams from taking place in her store since she started working there last September. She isn’t the only clerk who’s risen to the occasion: Stephanie Martinez, who works at a different Stinker Store outpost in greater Boise, stopped an elderly victim from depositing $10,000 into a different BTM in July.
“People stopping and disrupting these scams is the best way that we have to really affect it,” says Brad Thorne, a financial crimes detective with the Boise Police Department. “It’s much easier to stop it before it starts.”
Thorne says he briefed Stinker Stores’ leadership on the issue in an effort to increase awareness of the scams. Hardy says that no official training was provided by Stinker Stores to employees on spotting BTM scams. Stinker Stores, which operates gas stations across Idaho, Colorado, and Wyoming, didn’t reply to a request for comment.
Even so, vigilant gas station clerks alone can’t provide the bulwark needed to clamp down on a sprawling criminal enterprise. Even as the crypto industry enjoys a mainstream resurgence under the Trump administration, BTM scams are tearing through the country from Arizona to Florida. During the first half of 2024, scammers stole $65 million from Americans via BTMs, according to the Federal Trade Commission.
In February, Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), introduced an act cracking down on the scams. But so far, there’s been only a patchwork of state regulations governing the usage of BTMs. Some states, like Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Nebraska, require BTM owners to obtain certain licenses. In total, 20 states now either have laws, or have drafted bills, for crypto ATMs, according to the American Association of Retired People, which has been tracking the issue and advocating for reform. Connecticut, which enacted rules after Hogan and his colleagues met with state lawmakers, requires BTM owners to register with the state and provide identifying contact information such as an address and phone number. These licenses can be revoked and suspended by the state and civil penalties can be levied for non-compliance.
However, in Idaho, there are no licensing laws or rules prohibiting the amount of cash one can deposit into a kiosk. Absent guard rails, law enforcement has relied on store clerks to identify and ferret out the crimes.
Some state attorneys general have pursued legal action against manufacturers of Bitcoin ATMs. In February, Iowa attorney general Brenna Bird sued Bitcoin Depot and CoinFlip, accusing the companies of facilitating $20 million worth of scams over a three-year period. The suits alleged that “both Bitcoin Depot and CoinFlip profit directly from Iowa scam victims by imposing excessive, and often hidden, transaction fees,” according to a press release.
In response to a request for comment, a CoinFlip spokesperson said: “CoinFlip takes consumer protection seriously and holds itself to the highest standards of compliance and transparency. CoinFlip has been a registered Money Services Business (MSB) since 2015 and complies with all applicable state and federal regulations.”
Just this week, Washington, D.C., attorney general Brian L. Schwalb filed a similar suit against BTM operator Athena Bitcoin, alleging that 93 percent of transactions on its machines were the product of scams within a five-month period last year. Other class action suits have been filed against Bitcoin Depot this year: One in Indiana accused the company of facilitating cyberscams, while another, in Georgia, alleges negligence on behalf of Bitcoin Depot during a customer data breach.
A Bitcoin Depot spokesperson said: “Protecting customers from scams, especially seniors, remains a top priority, and we share the concern of store clerks and regulators striving to protect them.” The spokesperson also mentioned “multiple safeguards, including ID verification, transaction monitoring, real-time scam warnings, live customer support,” to aid in the event of fraudulent activity.
In its latest annual SEC Filing, however, Bitcoin Depot acknowledged that its safeguards may not be enough to protect consumers. “We have programs designed to vet and monitor these users and the transactions we process for them as part of our risk management efforts, but such programs require continuous improvement and may not be effective in detecting and preventing fraud and illegitimate transactions,” the company said in its 10-K filing. “Our services make us and our users a target for illegal or improper uses, including scams and fraud directed at our users, fraudulent or illegal sales of goods or services, money laundering, and terrorist financing,” the company added.
When money is sent from a Bitcoin ATM like that owned by Bitcoin Depot, it’s difficult to trace where it winds up. Crypto wallets live on the blockchain, identifiable through an alphanumeric address that anonymizes its owner.
When Hardy stopped customers from depositing cash into her store’s BTM, it’s possible she stymied thieves operating on the other side of the globe. Hogan has encountered scam outfits from all over the world, including Ghana, Nigeria, Southeast Asia, and China. “These places don’t have a lot of money, so if this is a method for them to make money, they’re going to do it,” he says. “Once you put money into the machine, you can’t get it back out,” he adds.
Detective Thorne, in Boise, has traced BitCoin Depot deposits from his state back to scammers in Nigeria, he says.
Of the dozens of motorists that enter Hardy’s store each day, she says, it’s rare that anyone ever needs the crypto ATM. Over the past year, Hardy estimates that fewer than two dozen patrons have used the BTM for a legitimate purpose. Everyone else who’s used it has been the victim of a scam, she says. “It’s not super, super popular, that Bitcoin machine.”
Are inspectors missing an easy way to catch HOS cheats and non-compliant ELDs?
Alex Lockie
As ELD service providers cold call trucking companies advertising ways to hide clear hours of service violations, a simple fix to the problem could be hidden in plain sight for roadside inspectors.
That’s according to Jill McBeth of Raven Transportation Safety Consulting, a company that helps motor carriers comply with HOS regs. McBeth has seen firsthand acts of ELD deception and lays the blame on non-compliant ELD service providers.
Drivers know that ELDs connect to the truck’s computer and automatically record events like driving time and stops. Drivers and fleets can edit ELD logs, like when a driver forgets to record lunch or a coffee break as off-duty time, with the driver required to approve any back-office edit, but lately a new type of ELD editing has emerged.
Overdrive reporting revealed that the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the multinational org charged with coming up with consistent, clear and uniform inspection protocols and the annually updated out-of-service criteria, has seen an uptick in suspiciously perfect ELD logs.
“What inspectors are finding with increased frequency are records of duty status (RODS) that are being completely altered with no indication they were edited at all,” said Jeremy Disbrow, CVSA’s Roadside Inspections Specialist. That’s contrary to what’s required of ELDs — if edits like those mentioned above are being made, the device by regulation is required to preserve those edits, and it’s a best practice for operators to annotate their records to explain edits to avoid roadside hassle.
But according to McBeth, the new type of masked alteration Disbrow noted inspectors are seeing does still leave behind indications of the edits, and if inspectors really cared to find them, they could.
Inspectors typically ask drivers to “send seven days of RODs” — that is, a seven-day logs history, she said. “And they have criteria in the technical standard for ELDs on how the devices must be able to transmit data.”
Overdrive spoke to a former inspector and CDL trainer who said most often these days, drivers transmit the HOS data via a PDF file sent over Bluetooth.
“If the driver doesn’t know how to transmit the data, that’s an OOS violation,” said McBeth. “If the driver says the app doesn’t allow them to transfer the data, the app is not compliant, and the driver is OOS.” But usually, the driver can and does comply, and seven days’ worth of logs is transmitted.
Those PDFs will show any edits made to the log, that the driver or carrier will then have to explain — if drivers are annotating their status changes or edits within the log, the transmitted record itself will help explain it. (For example: I forgot to switch into sleeper berth after parking.)
The new phenomenon of illegally edited ELDs doesn’t show any edits at all, but perfect adherence to the hours of service in the transmitted record.
Yet “every single device, if compliant, is programed to generate a CSV report that is identical” in structure with the same layout and headings as any other compliant device, said McBeth, referring to a “Comma Separated Values” file type that’s commonly used in spreadsheets like those produced in Microsoft Excel.
This sample of a CSV file from a non-compliant ELD shows that some of the driving time has been manually edited. It’s not easy to read, but to the trained eye, these type of edits jump out as needing further investigation, McBeth said.
The spreadsheets are required to conform to the technical standard outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations 395 subpart B section 4.8.2.1, which lays out in detail the columns, headings, and data that needs recording for an ELD to comply with the law.
Digging into the CSV file gets a little technical. McBeth shared with Overdrive sample CSV files from ELDs and pointed to a column that says if driving time was automatically recorded or not.
“You can look at this spreadsheet and in five seconds tell if that device is compliant or not compliant,” she said. Basically, the spreadsheet will show that driving time was manually edited, whereas the technical standard states an “ELD must not allow automatically recorded driving time to be shortened” unless under specific circumstances.
Hope Trans, the fleet behind the tragic Terrell, Texas, crash that killed five in June, had a long history of HOS violations, including stops with drivers that had no ELDs active. How could a company like that pass a DOT audit?
One former Hope Trans driver told local news outlet WFAA that “the company regularly altered shipping records to hide the true number of hours they had been driving.”
How exactly a non-compliant ELD company hides log edits isn’t exactly clear to McBeth, but she strongly suspects that “data manipulation is happening on a provider level. The provider that builds the app and sells it — they’re the ones doing the manipulation.”
Now, according to McBeth, inspectors are seeing suspiciously “perfect” driving logs at inspections.
“I’ve spoken to the other investigators in U.S. and Canada, and the reason [the ELD editing] gets flagged is that it’s way too perfect. There is no driver in the world that drives exactly 10 hours a day.”
This lines up with what Disbrow said previously:
“In many instances, the ELD entries that are shown to inspectors are inaccurate by hundreds or thousands of miles when compared to verified source documents, such as shipping papers, scale receipts, etc. When entire days or multiple days are completely falsified by manipulating the ELD data, inspectors have no way to identify when the driver was actually driving or resting, making it impossible to determine whether they have their required rest or available driving time.”
Of course, roadside inspectors mostly just check that the driver’s ELD shows compliance with the HOS. They do not, typically, check that the ELD complies with the technical standard. But McBeth said that with ELD providers themselves providing on-demand HOS clean up, “roadside inspections are the key” to halting cheats among providers and fleets before the records can be falsified.
Dispatcher Hector Adrien Esquivel Rodriguez recorded a call with a company called Logbook Hub that advertises on Facebook that it can “FIX your logbook” for $30 a week. Rodriguez posted a video to YouTube that featured the company telling him they only need drivers to call or text Logbook Hub, which works with several ELD providers to have driving time added to the books. The Logbook Hub representative described the company editing logs “24/7, no holidays” and manually manipulating driving time and distances.
“If you had a section of the road where you drove 30 miles,” the service can edit the log “squeezing that driving time, we’ll make it for example 55,” the representative said.
This is the kind of log manipulation McBeth said the CSV files will show if inspectors look beyond basic HOS compliance for drivers and into the compliance of the device itself.
While CVSA plans a new OOS violation for this behavior, Overdrive asked if it intended to start checking the CSV files and did not hear back.
FMCSA also did not respond to Overdrive request for comment on the matter in time for publication.
Judge rules on patent infringement complaint between ELD/telematics providers Samsara, Motive
Overdrive Staff
A preliminary ruling has been issued in Samsara’s battle with Motive Technologies over alleged patent infringement.
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) Judge Doris Johnson Hines determined that Motive does not infringe upon any valid Samsara patent claims, and no Section 337 (claims regarding intellectual property rights) violations were found.
Motive Chief Legal Officer Shu White said Samsara’s claims were an effort to stifle competition and disrupt Motive’s business.
“Knowing they were years behind on the AI front and losing major customers to Motive, Samsara attempted to close the gap by using patent litigation as a marketing tool. But the strategy failed,” Motive Founder and CEO Shoaib Makani wrote in a letter to customers following the ruling. “The Judge’s determination confirms what we have always known — Motive did not copy any of Samsara’s supposed inventions, and Motive’s AI technology is fundamentally better than Samsara’s.”
Samsara filed a lawsuit against Motive in January 2024, asking the court to enter judgment recognizing Motive’s infringement of Samsara’s patents covering several of its solutions in fleet management and driver safety included within Samsara’s telematics, video-based safety and sustainability solutions. The filing also stated that Motive illegally accessed Samsara’s platform and copied Samsara’s marketing materials.
Samsara, in February 2024, followed that lawsuit with this complaint to the ITC, and Motive filed a countersuit against Samsara that same month. Samsara filed another ITC complaint in November 2024, alleging that Motive misappropriated trade secrets and confidential information.
The ITC has not issued its final determination yet, and those other legal proceedings are ongoing.
In a statement to Overdrive sister publication CCJ, Samsara said its litigation was filed “in response to Motive’s multi-year campaign, conducted by Motive’s CEO and senior leaders from Motive’s engineering and product teams, to copy Samsara’s technology. As part of that effort, Motive’s leadership team secretly created fake customer accounts to gain access to Samsara’s systems to study and copy our technology. There are various actions pending against Motive, including claims for unfair competition, trade secret theft, false advertising, breach of contract, and other patent infringement claims.”
Regarding the ITC judge’s preliminary ruling, Samsara said it “does not impact our other ongoing legal actions against Motive, where we will continue to vigorously pursue our claims and ensure that Motive competes fairly and legally. The preliminary ITC ruling remains subject to review by the full Commission, and we are evaluating all options for further review.”
ELD tampering: CVSA drafts new inspections bulletin to combat ‘dangerous trend’
Alex Lockie
ELD tampering has become such a widespread phenomenon that sales agents are cold calling motor carriers offering “ELD editing” and authorities are drafting a new inspections bulletin to combat the “dangerous trend,” according to trucking owner-ops and enforcement communities.
Owner-operator Ilya Denisenko recently got a cold call from a company called AVN Logistics Group. Denisenko said it promised “services such as ELDs, dispatching, oversize permits and e-log editing.”
Contacted by Overdrive about the last of those services, a rep at AVN first said they could add driving time to a driver’s ELD after the driver had run out of hours. Later, however, they insisted the AVN operation was performing strictly legal edits.
Similarly, dispatcher Hector Adrien Esquivel Rodriguez got an unsolicited call from a company called Logbook Hub that advertises on Facebook that it can “FIX your logbook” for $30 a week. Rodriguez posted a video to YouTube that featured him asking this question to the company: “Let’s say I don’t have any more time, I already used my 14 and my 11, and I need to run one more hour. Can you help?”
“Yes, totally,” the voice on the other end of the line responds, saying they have a number drivers can text and a team will edit the logs for them “24/7, no holidays.”
According to Rodriguez, “this company damages the industry, and they are a risk for the people on the road.”
Rodriguez and Denisenko aren’t alone in flagging such out-of-bounds activities. Since the ELD mandate came into play in late 2017, this sort of e-log tampering has grown in prominence so much so that inspectors are contemplating new enforcement mechanisms. The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance of law enforcement and industry stakeholders has seen the uptick, and it’s ready to act.
Jeremy Disbrow, CVSA’s Roadside Inspections Specialist, explained what inspectors are seeing now. “Per the ELD technical specifications, driving time that is detected by the ELD cannot be reassigned to a non-driving duty status,” he said. “Additionally, any edits that are made to the record must show they were edited so the edits are identifiable to safety officials. What inspectors are finding with increased frequency are records of duty status (RODS) that are being completely altered with no indication they were edited at all.”
This has created a problem for inspectors, as instead of showing a one-time lapse in HOS records, these new entirely fabricated ELD reports show wildly divergent activity.
“In many instances, the ELD entries that are shown to inspectors are inaccurate by hundreds or thousands of miles when compared to verified source documents, such as shipping papers, scale receipts, etc.,” said Disbrow. “When entire days or multiple days are completely falsified by manipulating the ELD data, inspectors have no way to identify when the driver was actually driving or resting, making it impossible to determine whether they have their required rest or available driving time.”
As Disbrow noted, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s ELD mandate device specifications in 2017 required that log records can’t be edited without evidence of such editing being left behind in a driver’s record in the device. Yet FMCSA doesn’t actually test the code and hardware for each individual ELD in its device registry, all of which initially self-certified that they follow the rules.
Today, there are more than 1,000 ELD models on FMCSA’s device registry.
The kinds of tampering described above have become become something of an open secret, according to watchers. Disbrow said when inspectors interview drivers about ELD tampering, some common themes emerge. Here’s how he described a typical scenario:
“The motor carrier tells the driver to contact them when they run out of available time to drive,” he said. The motor carrier then “contacts a third party who is able to quickly alter the records to eliminate any violations.” The scenario lines up with what the Logbook Hub rep told Rodriguez.
In some ways, this kind of thing isn’t exactly new. ELD cheating has been around as long as ELDs themselves. Paper logs, too, have long injected a kind of “honor system” into HOS regulations. But this new brand of tampering isn’t any kind of honor system, nor is it like ghost logs, where one driver has two ELDs, one under a fake name to look like a co-driver.
Today’s problem looks to have hit industrial scale, aided and abetted by businesses purpose-built to help motor carriers evade HOS regulations.
“This type of tampering cannot happen unintentionally. It is not a simple error in a record of duty because a driver accidentally made a mistake,” said Disbrow. “This type of tampering is conducted, often by third parties outside of the U.S., on devices that do not meet the technical specifications in the federal regulations.”
These third parties are “completely fabricating the record to show a compliant ELD file without any violations, and in many cases, even falsify electronic supporting documents to match the ELD file,” which gives inspectors real trouble, he said. As of about a year ago, he added, there had been some “isolated reports of inspectors encountering this type of tampering,” yet over the past year, “as inspectors have learned of these techniques, there have been many more instances uncovered across the country.”
CVSA has been passing that information around among inspectors, industry and FMCSA “to help minimize the impact of this dangerous trend,” he said. CVSA’s Driver-Traffic Enforcement Committee “took two important steps to help curtail fatigued driving as a result of ELD tampering.” The first step is the new inspection bulletin “that explains the difference between a typical false entry in a record of duty status, such as a driver claiming off-duty time while fueling their vehicle, and an ELD file that has been manipulated.”
The second was a CVSA committee vote “to add a section to the North American Out of Service Criteria (OOSC) for ELD tampering,” Disbrow added. Currently OOS language for false entries “requires an inspector to prove that the driver would have exceeded the 11, 14, 60 or 70-hour rules at the time of the inspection if the record was not falsified.”
That language “will not change,” but with the dawn of a new era of ELD tampering, “entire days are often manipulated making it impossible for inspectors to determine when actual driving or rest periods occurred,” as noted above. In those instances, “the committee suggested to add an OOS violation to the OOSC which would automatically place the driver OOS until they obtain the required rest.”
The change in the OOSC won’t come quickly, however. CVSA membership will have a final vote on the topic near the end of the year, and the OOSC is annually updated in April. This year, CVSA made the emergency move to add English language proficiency back to the OOSC by June 25, but Disbrow didn’t mention any such effort on the ELD-tampering front. “If it is added to the OOSC, the bulletin,” as is usual, “will be released prior to April 1, 2026, to prepare enforcement and industry for the change,” said Disbrow.
Disbrow acknowledged that some among Overdrive‘s readers “will be concerned about a new OOS condition being added,” but clarified that “this type of tampering will not be a problem for any carriers that are trying to be compliant. This type of tampering is completely intentional and often requires the carrier to pay a third party to ‘scrub’ their logs of any violations.”
FMCSA didn’t respond to questions about what the agency might be doing in response to CVSA’s alerting them to the new trend in ELD tampering, yet FMCSA does semi-regularly remove ELDs from the approved-devices registry. Disbrow said CVSA was “working closely with law enforcement to uncover these tactics and sharing information with FMCSA.”
Disbrow also mentioned something of a “revolving door” problem with the bad actors on ELD registry. “FMCSA maintains the list of approved ELDs that have self-certified,” he said, yet as FMCSA becomes “aware of non-compliant devices, they conduct investigations and revoke these non-compliant devices when appropriate. Unfortunately, some of these companies start over under a new name and the process repeats itself.”
It remains unclear if FMCSA has acted on CVSA-shared information on the tampering issue.
Disbrow concluded with a focus on on bedrock safety outcomes, emphasizing that this type of tampering could open carriers and drivers up to major criminal and civil liabilities, particularly in the event a crash.
“While it may be tempting to tamper with an ELD to gain some extra driving time, the violations that may follow are frankly the least of anyone’s concerns,” he said. “The larger issue is the criminal and civil liability that will follow in the event of a collision, not to mention the potential injuries or loss of life from the collision. This trend is nothing short of fraud and false information, and the liability to the motor carrier or driver during a lawsuit or criminal trial is a far bigger concern.”
Alex Lockie
As ELD service providers cold call trucking companies advertising ways to hide clear hours of service violations, a simple fix to the problem could be hidden in plain sight for roadside inspectors.
That’s according to Jill McBeth of Raven Transportation Safety Consulting, a company that helps motor carriers comply with HOS regs. McBeth has seen firsthand acts of ELD deception and lays the blame on non-compliant ELD service providers.
Drivers know that ELDs connect to the truck’s computer and automatically record events like driving time and stops. Drivers and fleets can edit ELD logs, like when a driver forgets to record lunch or a coffee break as off-duty time, with the driver required to approve any back-office edit, but lately a new type of ELD editing has emerged.
Overdrive reporting revealed that the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the multinational org charged with coming up with consistent, clear and uniform inspection protocols and the annually updated out-of-service criteria, has seen an uptick in suspiciously perfect ELD logs.
“What inspectors are finding with increased frequency are records of duty status (RODS) that are being completely altered with no indication they were edited at all,” said Jeremy Disbrow, CVSA’s Roadside Inspections Specialist. That’s contrary to what’s required of ELDs — if edits like those mentioned above are being made, the device by regulation is required to preserve those edits, and it’s a best practice for operators to annotate their records to explain edits to avoid roadside hassle.
But according to McBeth, the new type of masked alteration Disbrow noted inspectors are seeing does still leave behind indications of the edits, and if inspectors really cared to find them, they could.
Inspectors typically ask drivers to “send seven days of RODs” — that is, a seven-day logs history, she said. “And they have criteria in the technical standard for ELDs on how the devices must be able to transmit data.”
Overdrive spoke to a former inspector and CDL trainer who said most often these days, drivers transmit the HOS data via a PDF file sent over Bluetooth.
“If the driver doesn’t know how to transmit the data, that’s an OOS violation,” said McBeth. “If the driver says the app doesn’t allow them to transfer the data, the app is not compliant, and the driver is OOS.” But usually, the driver can and does comply, and seven days’ worth of logs is transmitted.
Those PDFs will show any edits made to the log, that the driver or carrier will then have to explain — if drivers are annotating their status changes or edits within the log, the transmitted record itself will help explain it. (For example: I forgot to switch into sleeper berth after parking.)
The new phenomenon of illegally edited ELDs doesn’t show any edits at all, but perfect adherence to the hours of service in the transmitted record.
Yet “every single device, if compliant, is programed to generate a CSV report that is identical” in structure with the same layout and headings as any other compliant device, said McBeth, referring to a “Comma Separated Values” file type that’s commonly used in spreadsheets like those produced in Microsoft Excel.
This sample of a CSV file from a non-compliant ELD shows that some of the driving time has been manually edited. It’s not easy to read, but to the trained eye, these type of edits jump out as needing further investigation, McBeth said.
The spreadsheets are required to conform to the technical standard outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations 395 subpart B section 4.8.2.1, which lays out in detail the columns, headings, and data that needs recording for an ELD to comply with the law.
Digging into the CSV file gets a little technical. McBeth shared with Overdrive sample CSV files from ELDs and pointed to a column that says if driving time was automatically recorded or not.
“You can look at this spreadsheet and in five seconds tell if that device is compliant or not compliant,” she said. Basically, the spreadsheet will show that driving time was manually edited, whereas the technical standard states an “ELD must not allow automatically recorded driving time to be shortened” unless under specific circumstances.
Hope Trans, the fleet behind the tragic Terrell, Texas, crash that killed five in June, had a long history of HOS violations, including stops with drivers that had no ELDs active. How could a company like that pass a DOT audit?
One former Hope Trans driver told local news outlet WFAA that “the company regularly altered shipping records to hide the true number of hours they had been driving.”
How exactly a non-compliant ELD company hides log edits isn’t exactly clear to McBeth, but she strongly suspects that “data manipulation is happening on a provider level. The provider that builds the app and sells it — they’re the ones doing the manipulation.”
Now, according to McBeth, inspectors are seeing suspiciously “perfect” driving logs at inspections.
“I’ve spoken to the other investigators in U.S. and Canada, and the reason [the ELD editing] gets flagged is that it’s way too perfect. There is no driver in the world that drives exactly 10 hours a day.”
This lines up with what Disbrow said previously:
“In many instances, the ELD entries that are shown to inspectors are inaccurate by hundreds or thousands of miles when compared to verified source documents, such as shipping papers, scale receipts, etc. When entire days or multiple days are completely falsified by manipulating the ELD data, inspectors have no way to identify when the driver was actually driving or resting, making it impossible to determine whether they have their required rest or available driving time.”
Of course, roadside inspectors mostly just check that the driver’s ELD shows compliance with the HOS. They do not, typically, check that the ELD complies with the technical standard. But McBeth said that with ELD providers themselves providing on-demand HOS clean up, “roadside inspections are the key” to halting cheats among providers and fleets before the records can be falsified.
Dispatcher Hector Adrien Esquivel Rodriguez recorded a call with a company called Logbook Hub that advertises on Facebook that it can “FIX your logbook” for $30 a week. Rodriguez posted a video to YouTube that featured the company telling him they only need drivers to call or text Logbook Hub, which works with several ELD providers to have driving time added to the books. The Logbook Hub representative described the company editing logs “24/7, no holidays” and manually manipulating driving time and distances.
“If you had a section of the road where you drove 30 miles,” the service can edit the log “squeezing that driving time, we’ll make it for example 55,” the representative said.
This is the kind of log manipulation McBeth said the CSV files will show if inspectors look beyond basic HOS compliance for drivers and into the compliance of the device itself.
While CVSA plans a new OOS violation for this behavior, Overdrive asked if it intended to start checking the CSV files and did not hear back.
By Shiza Saad, NDAA Summer 2025 Intern
The new academic year is just around the corner, and it is imperative that all drivers on the road be reminded of the importance of putting safety first for the millions of children going to school every day. School buses are the most common mode of transportation for these children and play an impactful role in their lives. Fortunately, statistics show that school buses are actually one of the safest vehicles on the road. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA), less than 1% of all traffic fatalities involve children on school transportation vehicles. In addition to their many safety features, school buses have been designed so that their passengers experience less impact in case a crash does happen.1 The highest risk level these children encounter is when they are about to enter or leave a school bus, because other
1 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “School Bus Safety.” NHTSA. Accessed July 1, 2025. www.nhtsa.gov/road-safety/school-bus-safety.
National District Attorneys Association. School Bus Safety: Keeping America’s Children Safe drivers on the road may not stop so that they may safely cross the road. Luckily, it is illegal in every state to pass a school bus when its stop-arm is extended, and its red lights are flashing. The safety of schoolchildren depends not only on the bus driver, but also the drivers of the other surrounding vehicles. Thus, it is essential to distribute information relating to school bus safety and general road safety as the school year approaches.
Safety Recommendations for School Buses
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted investigations into school bus safety by focusing on individual crashes in which children died or were injured. One of the biggest issues when discussing school bus safety is the inclusion of seat belts in designing school buses. It is important to note that school buses without seat belts are still considered It is illegal in every state to pass a school bus when its stop-arm is extended, and its red lights are very safe, due to a technology known as compartmentalization. School bus seats are built with a steel inner structure that absorbs energy efficiently, alongside their high, padded backs and secure attachment to the bus floor. This passive occupant protection system protects children in the event of a crash by minimizing impact. However, the NTSB suggests that new school buses include lap or shoulder belts, because in some of the crashes they investigated, the additional protection of seatbelts could have reduced injuries or saved lives. As such, the NTSB has made official recommendations regarding seat belts on school buses to the states of California, Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, and Texas, along with many relevant traffic safety organizations.2 f lashing.
Some states have already made progress putting seatbelts on school buses. In May 2025, Illinois passed a bill requiring all school buses made after 2031 to have seat belts that go over the lap and shoulder of passengers. The bill does not ensure that any authority will make sure that the seat belts are being worn; buses are just required to have them. There will be an estimated increase of $7,000 to $18,000 to the price of school buses.3 In Massachusetts, a bill that would require all school buses to have seat belts, along with mandatory use while the bus is in motion, is currently under consideration.4 There are nine states, including Iowa, that have laws mandating seat belts on school buses. However, many of these laws depend on school districts’ budgets, such as in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. The states of California, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York all have laws that require new school buses made or bought after a certain date to be equipped with seat belts.5
Furthermore, the NTSB made official recommendations to upgrade the laws regarding drivers passing stopped school buses. Though the act is illegal in all states, the board has advised that legislation be enacted to enable stop-arm cameras to capture images and allow citations to be issued for illegal school bus passings using the information obtained by the cameras.6 In May 2025, Colorado passed a bill allowing school districts to install artificial intelligence-powered cameras on school buses. For school districts that opt in, these cameras will identify drivers and their vehicles’ license plates when they pass a school bus illegally. Violators can be fined up to $300, with the fines automatically going back to the school districts.7
2 National Transportation Safety Board. “School Bus Safety.” NTSB, 2024. Accessed July 1, 2025. www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/SafetyIssues/ Pages/School-Bus-Safety.aspx.
3 Hancock, Peter. “Lawmakers Pass Bills on AI Community College Instruction, Food Handling, School Bus Seat Belts.” Capitol News Illinois, May 21, 2025. capitolnewsillinois.com/news/lawmakers-pass-bills-on-ai-community-college-instruction-food-handling-school-bus-seat belts/.
4 DaSilva, Melanie. “Bill in Massachusetts Would Require Seat Belts on School …” WPRI, December 5, 2023. www.wpri.com/new-england/ massachusetts/bill-in-massachusetts-would-require-seat-belts-on-school-buses.
5 Heath, Keri. “Are Seat Belts Required on School Buses? Here Are the Nine States with Laws in the Books.” Austin American-Statesman, November 14, 2024. www.statesman.com/story/news/education/2024/11/14/texas-law-seat-belts-school-buses-us-safety requirements/75866984007/.
6 National Transportation Safety Board. “School Bus Safety.”
7 Chambers, Tanner. “Colorado Cracks down with AI as School Bus Cameras Aim to Keep Kids Safe.” K99, May 27, 2025. k99.com/colorado artificial-intelligence-school-bus/. Between the Lines | August 2025 | 2 School Bus Safety: Keeping America’s Children Safe
The NTSB also made several suggestions to utilize new, advanced vehicle technology to increase safety, including collision avoidance systems, automatic emergency braking technologies, automatic crash notification systems, and high-quality onboard video systems that provide visibility of the driver, each occupant seating location, and low-light recording capability. Lastly, the board also advocated for increased fire safety on school buses, mainly recommending that all buses be equipped with fire suppression systems that at a minimum address engine fires.8
The Dangers of Impaired Driving by School Bus Drivers
School bus drivers are some of the most trusted individuals in any community. Every day, parents of about 25 million students across the nation trust the drivers of nearly 500,000 buses9 to safely take their children to and from school and school-related activities. When that trust is violated, the consequences can be dire. An investigation conducted by Stateline found that since 2015, more than 1,620 schoolchildren across 38 states have been put in harm’s way due to bus drivers arrested or cited for allegedly driving under the influence.10
Despite the incredible danger presented by such situations, they are mostly untracked by government officials. Stateline reviewed police records, court filings, and news media reports to find that in the last five years, there have been at least 118 school bus drivers caught by police for driving while impaired. Of these cases, more than a third involved a bus crash which injured a total of almost three dozen students. Most of the cases occurred due to abuse of alcohol, but a third of the drivers had taken drugs. Officials have stated this is connected to the unfortunate growth of overuse of opioids and other prescription medication in the nation.11
Most states enact stricter laws governing the operation of school buses than those for other commercial motor vehicle (CMV) Alongside these cases, other school bus drivers have been found to be impaired because of random drug and alcohol screenings. Since 2015, around 260 drivers across five states have either failed or refused to take the tests. It is apparent that no officials at the state or federal level track cases of impaired school bus drivers. The lack of data collection is concerning; Stateline contacted 268 agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, such as education departments, state police, transportation departments, and court systems, to discover that only about 11% had any data regarding the issue. Clearly, a change needs to be made, as this data would be of great interest for all parents and the general public.12
There are laws pertaining to drivers operating a school bus. States require school bus drivers to have a commercial driver’s license (CDL) with special endorsements to transport students. Generally, in order to obtain a CDL, applicants must meet medical requirements, complete Entry-Level Driver Training, and pass skills and knowledge tests.13 While federal laws set minimum standards to obtain and maintain a CDL, the set of laws that govern the operation of school buses vary depending on the purpose and the entity performing transport.14 Most states enact stricter laws governing the operation of school buses than those for other commercial motor vehicle (CMV) operation. CMV drivers may not consume alcohol within four hours of going on duty nor have a detectable amount of alcohol when operating a CMV. While the blood alcohol threshold for driving under
8 National Transportation Safety Board. “School Bus Safety.”
9 Bergal, Jenni. “Drunken School Bus Drivers Put Kids’ Lives at Risk.” Stateline, January 22, 2020. Accessed July 1, 2025. stateline.org/2020/01/22/drunken-school-bus-drivers-put-kids-lives-at-risk/.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Barr, Mariah. “Dot Compliance Review: FMCSA Requirements for School Buses & Bus Drivers.” Foley, July 17, 2024. www.foleyservices.com/ articles/dot-compliance-review-fmcsa-requirements-for-school-bus-drivers.
14 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. “Information for School Bus Operators.” www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/ files/2020-9/School%20Bus%20Brochure_508.pdf.
the influence for other CMV drivers is .04, some states have enacted a lower threshold for school bus drivers. The presence of minors on board can also increase the criminal charges for driving under the influence, with penalties ranging from fines to prison time.15
To adequately enforce these laws, it is necessary that agencies take the initiative to collect data regarding impaired school bus drivers. States should also ensure that drivers are being routinely screened for use of alcohol and drugs. Without proper regulation, millions of children could be put in danger.
School Bus Crashes
According to the National Safety Council, 128 people were killed in 2023 due to school bus-related crashes, which is 23% higher than the 104 deaths in 2022. From 2014 to 2023, 71% of deaths in such crashes were people in vehicles other than the school bus, 16% were pedestrians, 6% were school bus passengers, 4% were school bus drivers, and 3% were pedal cyclists. Of those injured, 34% were school bus passengers, 9% were school bus drivers, and 52% were occupants of other vehicles.16
In Dayton, Tennessee on a November morning in 2018, school bus driver Michael Ledbetter was told by his supervisor to pull over after students onboard phoned their parents as Ledbetter was swerving across lanes and driving through red lights. Police gave him field sobriety tests which he failed, and it was later found through a blood test that he had a .127 blood alcohol level. That is more than three times the legal limit of .04 for commercial drivers. Ledbetter pleaded guilty to driving under the influence while accompanied by minors and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail and 18 months of probation.17
While the blood alcohol threshold for DUI for other CMV drivers is .04, some states have enacted a lower threshold for school bus drivers. Ledbetter is not alone in his poor decisions. A New Mexico driver consumed several tall cans of Coors Light the morning before crashing his bus, which had 25 children on board, into a tree after almost careening off a bridge. A driver in Wisconsin had taken large amounts of anti-anxiety and pain pills when he veered off the road and crashed into a cornfield with four students on board.18
There are many other causes for school bus crashes besides impaired driving, with distracted driving being one of the most common. A school bus crashed into a house in North Philadelphia, injuring four elementary school students. Witnesses repeatedly claimed that the driver was using his cell phone prior to the crash.19 School bus drivers can also be distracted by children on the bus, especially by younger children. Besides these cases, there are also other crashes caused by rarer issues, such as a 2015 crash in Santa Ana, California which happened due to the driver passing out behind the wheel. Gerald Rupple hid a medical condition from district officials that caused him to experience dizziness, seizures, and blackouts. All children on the bus were injured, with four sustaining major injuries. Rupple was charged with one felony count each of child abuse and endangerment.20
15 Barr, Mariah. “Dot Compliance Review: FMCSA Requirements for School Buses & Bus Drivers.” Foley, July 17, 2024. www.foleyservices.com/ articles/dot-compliance-review-fmcsa-requirements-for-school-bus-drivers.
16 National Safety Council. “School Bus Crashes—Injury Facts.” NSC, 2023. Accessed July 1, 2025. injuryfacts.nsc.org/motor-vehicle/road-users/ school-bus/.
17 Bergal, “Drunken Drivers Put Kids’ Lives at Risk.”
18 Ibid.
19 Kofsky, Joel. “Distracted Driving Possible Cause of School Bus Crash.” Philly Injury Lawyer, August 10, 2020. Accessed July 1, 2025. www.phillyinjurylawyer.com/distracted-driving-possible-cause-school-bus-crash/.
20 ABC7.com Staff. “School Bus Driver Charged in Anaheim Hills Crash.” ABC7 Los Angeles, January 10, 2015. Accessed July 1, 2025. abc7.com/oc-bus-crash-anaheim-hills-passed-out-driver/469347/. Between the Lines | August 2025 | 4 School Bus Safety: Keeping America’s Children Safe
Looking Forward
For the new school year, it is important for school districts to emphasize the crucial role that school bus drivers play in the community and to remind them of the great responsibility they bear. Relevant organizations should take steps to advocate for improvements to school bus safety features, and government agencies should be avid in their collection of data related to school bus crashes, especially in the cases of impaired driving. School buses transport millions of students every single day—their significance should not be underestimated.
