ason McDaniel
Key Highlights
- The GHOSTRUCK Act mandates that only North American-based personnel can edit electronic logging device records.
- The legislation preserves driver approval over any changes to their duty status logs, ensuring final oversight remains with the driver.
- Foreign dispatchers and personnel are explicitly prohibited from manipulating driver logs under the new bill.
2037985262 | Adobe Stock
The GHOSTRUCK Act, supported by NTTC and other trucking organizations, seeks to close loopholes allowing foreign-based personnel to manipulate electronic logging device records, thereby enhancing highway safety and driver accountability.
National Tank Truck Carriers supports the GHOSTRUCK Act—the new bipartisan “Guarding Hours-of-Service Oversight and Stopping Tampering by Remote Unofficial Carrier Keeper” legislation designed to strengthen the integrity of electronic logging device (ELD) records and improve highway safety by closing a loophole that allows foreign-based personnel to manipulate driver logs.
The GHOSTRUCK Act was introduced by U.S. Representatives Greg Steube (R-Fla.) and Dave Taylor (R-Ohio).
Ryan Streblow, NTTC president and CEO of NTTC, emphasized the critical nature of the bill for the tank truck industry.
“Safety is at the heart of everything we do at National Tank Truck Carriers,” Streblow said in a news release. “The GHOSTRUCK Act strengthens the integrity of the hours-of-service system by ensuring that edits to electronic logging device records are made only by authorized personnel physically located in North America and remain subject to driver approval.
“Accountability in driver records is essential to maintaining compliance, protecting drivers from undue pressure, and ensuring that commercial motor vehicles operate safely on our nation’s highways.”
According to a report from Bulk Transporter’s affiliate publication, FleetOwner, the legislation addresses growing concerns that overseas dispatchers are altering driver logs while remaining beyond the reach of U.S. accountability and enforcement measures. Current federal law does not explicitly prohibit foreign-based personnel from editing or annotating these records, a gap that proponents say allows for the falsification of logs and the overworking of drivers.
The GHOSTRUCK Act would mandate that any edits or annotations to an ELD record be made only by a carrier, dispatcher, or driver physically located in North America. Critically, the bill preserves the requirement that all edits remain subject to driver approval, ensuring the driver maintains final say over their record of duty status.
Steube noted that the act is necessary because foreign actors have been found falsifying driver logs to avoid accountability when tragedies occur on American roads. Beyond NTTC, the bill has garnered broad industry support from other trucking organizations, including American Trucking Associations, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, and the Truckload Carriers Association.
“Foreign dispatchers should not be able to manipulate trucking safety records from halfway around the world and put American lives at risk,” Steube said in a release. “Reports have exposed how overseas actors are falsifying driver logs, overworking truckers beyond safe limits, and avoiding accountability when tragedies occur.
“The GHOSTRUCK Act closes this loophole and helps keep our roads safe.”
Alex Lockie
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has released new guidance on what to do about drivers being coerced into violating safety regulations as the agency cracks down on electronic logging device providers.
The new guidance, in the form of a question-and-answer document, lays out clearly what coercion is, and what drivers can do about it.
Entitled “FAQs: Prohibited Coercion of CMV Drivers,” the document was issued in late April “to help drivers understand how they might be coerced to violate safety regulations and what they can do if they believe they have been coerced.”
FMCSA released the FAQ just a little over two weeks after the Super Ego chameleon carrier story made a splash in the mainstream news.
There’s plenty of stories out there of freight fraud, bad broker behavior and skimping driver pay, but the Super Ego network’s story stands out in that drivers allegedly were coerced into driving well past legal hours limits with ELDs manipulated, with company direction.
ELD/hours of service cheating is illegal for drivers, period, even if a fleet or other party twists an arm or two, or designs a lease system that demands an impossible number of miles to make ends meet.
Roadcheck, upcoming next week, will take a special look at such manipulation and the HOS violations it produces.
FMCSA’s new FAQ specifically mentions drivers being coerced into falsifying logs or driving beyond hours limitations.
Overdrive recently published a driver’s testimony, complete with video evidence alleging Prime Route, a carrier in Super Ego’s chameleon network, had drivers cheat on their hours with company manipulation of their ELDs. The driver, participating in the Return to Duty program after a failed drug test, felt he had no choice but to run illegally.
Prime Route has since denied any wrongdoing, but without providing specifics.
What FMCSA is saying about the Coercion Rule (49 CFR 390.6)
FMCSA’s new guidance says the “coercion rule”, 49 CFR 390.6, “is designed to protect commercial motor vehicle drivers from being pressured to violate the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) by motor carriers, shippers, receivers, and transportation intermediaries (brokers) and their agents, officers, or representatives.”
Overdrive‘s 2019 series “Cracks in the System” detailed the ins and out of the rule, then in relative infancy.
The agency gives the examples of drivers being pressured to run over hours limits, to falsify logs, speed, run unsafe equipment with known out-of-service defects, move overweight loads, or run when the driver is sick or has been drinking.
The regulatory definition of “coercion” in 49 CFR 390.5T specifically apply to brokers, too, featuring this part: “a threat to withhold business, employment, or work opportunities from a driver, a threat to take or permit adverse employment action against a driver, or actually taking any of these actions against a driver, which is done in order to induce the driver to take an action that would violate the FMCSRs or punish the driver for refusing to violate the FMCSRs.”
FMCSA gives the following example of how coercion might play out in sequence.
- The Request: A carrier, shipper, or broker requests a driver perform a task that would violate a safety regulation.
- The Objection: The driver informs the requestor that the driver would not be able to complete the task without violating a regulation. This can be done in writing (for example, responding to a text message or email) or verbally during a conversation.
- The Threat or Negative Action: The requesting party makes a threat — either direct or implied — to take negative action against the driver’s employment or work opportunities in order to pressure the driver to comply, or actually takes negative action to punish the driver for refusing to commit the violation. Importantly, the requesting party does not need to follow through on the threat — just the fact that a threat was made is enough for coercion to have occurred.
Drivers filing a coercion complaint will need to set out the facts of how the coercion occurred.
While the coercion rules can apply to brokers or even shippers, they especially apply to employers. Employers “are prohibited from withholding business, employment or work opportunities from a driver, taking or permitting any adverse employment action against a driver, or threatening to” do so.
If a carrier does threatens to fire, deny future loads, reduce miles, cut pay or bonuses, impose fines, assign less-desirable routes or no loads at all, or even deliberately damaging a driver’s reputation, that’s all actionable, FMCSA wrote.
What drivers can do about coercion
“Coercion occurs the moment a threat is made,” FMCSA wrote. “The driver does not actually have to commit the violation for coercion to have occurred.”
Simply threatening a driver counts as a violation, or even punishing a driver for not committing a violation of FMCSR counts too.
In those cases, FMCSA advises the drivers keep detailed records such as copies of ELD messages, texts or emails. Drivers can even write up their own account of what happened “while it is fresh in his or her memory” and email it to themselves to have a timestamp.
Next, file a complaint with FMCSA.
“A written complaint must be filed within 90 calendar days of the incident and must be submitted to the National Consumer Complaint Database (NCCDB) or the FMCSA Division Administrator for the State where the driver is employed,” FMCSA wrote.
Drivers can call 1-888-DOT-SAFT (1-888-368-7238) as well.
Make sure to include the following info:
- The driver’s name, address, and telephone number.
- The name and business address of the person allegedly coercing the driver.
- The regulation(s) that the driver alleges he or she was coerced to violate.
- A concise but complete statement of the facts the driver is relying on to show that an incident involving coercion occurred, including the date of each alleged violation.
For more info, call the FMCSA Information Line, 1-800-832-5660 or read the FAQ directly.
Truck driver log falsification violations can lead to out-of-service orders, fines, bad federal safety scores, failed DOT audits, civil penalties, even nuclear verdicts. What can motor carriers do?
Deborah Lockridge
Log falsifications were the fourth most common driver-related violation discovered in roadside commercial vehicle inspections from 2019 to 2023. And they’re the second most common violation discovered in compliance reviews of motor carriers. Brandon Wiseman, president of Trucksafe Consulting, explains why — and what trucking companies can do about it — in this episode of HDT Talks Trucking. Click on Link below to see video.
Click on link below to see video.
https://youtu.be/kObI4QCMU7Y
NTSB report finds fake driver logs contributed to Triton Logistics crash that killed 3
John Gallagher
WASHNGTON — Safety investigators have warned the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to tighten electronic logging device (ELD) requirements to prevent trucking companies and their drivers from creating fake driver hours-of-service (HOS) logs.
The recommendation by the National Transportation Safety Board was included in a crash report issued on Wednesday concluding that truck driver fatigue, due to excessive driving time and limited opportunity to sleep, was the probable cause of a December 2022 crash on I-64 in Virginia in which the truck driver rammed the back of medium-size bus, killing three people.
“Contributing to the truck driver’s fatigue was the motor carrier, Triton Logistics Incorporated, which created fictitious driver accounts in the electronic logging device system and enabled drivers to operate their vehicles for hours in excess of federal regulations,” the NTSB stated.
Over the course of the 20-month investigation, the NTSB found that management of the Romeoville, Illinois-based trucking company would instruct drivers to manipulate ELD driver logs when they exceeded their federal drive-time limits.
“Specifically, the drivers would call in to the carrier’s HOS department by cell phone and the carrier would log them into the alternate driver account, which allowed them to continue driving under a false account and circumvent the HOS regulations,” the NTSB report stated.
Daniel Cramer, 61, the driver of the truck involved in the crash, described to investigators the existence of a data center in Lithuania “that Triton used to manage — and when needed, manipulate — drivers’ electronic logs to make it look like they had more time for rest than they really did,” according to WAVY.com reporting in March.
In the days leading up to the crash, Cramer had exceeded FMCSA’s 14-hour driving window four times and the 11-hour driving limit three times. He had also exceeded the 70-hour rule by more than 4 hours in a period of 7 consecutive days.
“Also, because drivers were paid by the mile, they were financially incentivized to exceed their HOS limits because it allowed them to drive farther and earn more money,” NTSB stated.
The agency noted that Triton’s chief executive officer and the HOS manager denied knowing about fictitious logins. The company did not respond to phone calls by FreightWaves seeking comment on the report’s findings.
After an on-site focused review conducted of Triton after the crash, FMCSA found violations that included making, or permitting a driver to make, a false report regarding their duty status and allowing a driver to exceed HOS limits.
FMCSA fined Triton $36,170 for those violations along with failure to conduct post-crash alcohol testing. It also assigned Triton a “conditional” safety rating, which means a carrier does not have adequate safety management controls in place to ensure compliance with the safety fitness standards.
As a result of the investigation, NTSB recommended that FMCSA revise ELD requirements to require that ELD providers create an audit log that includes:
- Date.
- Driver login time and who logged them in.
- Names of anyone who edited the log.
- Driver’s license numbers.
- Active driver list changes.
Other recommendations include:
- The Commonwealth of Virginia should offer management safety guidance to new intrastate motor carrier licensees covering license class, drug and alcohol testing, fatigue management, vehicle maintenance, and safe commercial vehicle operation.
- Triton Logistics should implement a process to regularly verify the accuracy of drivers’ records of duty, implement a strong fatigue management program, and use onboard inward- and forward-facing video event recording to improve driver training.
- Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance should use this crash to educate members on the importance of safeguarding the ELD system to prevent falsification of information.
NTSB also reiterated two previous recommendations:
- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should complete the development of performance standards to assess forward collision avoidance systems in commercial vehicles. NHTSA should also require that all trucks over 10,000 pounds be equipped with onboard video recorders that record event data.
- FMCSA should provide guidance to motor carriers on the use of onboard video recordings to ensure driver compliance with regulations and safe operations.
(This false log method does not require spoofing or jamming. Just adding the ghost driver and lying to the MCSAP inspector.)
OKTA
GPS spoofing is when a counterfeit radio signal is transmitted to a receiver antenna to counteract and override a legitimate GPS satellite signal. It is often a form of cyberattack perpetrated by bad actors attempting to steer goods or people off course.
GPS spoofing can be used to steal shipments, send boaters into the hands of pirates, or project a false location.
Global positioning system, or GPS, technology is a standard part of many businesses and used by many consumers.
Using GPS can help individuals to navigate from one point to another. It is common practice for shipping and individuals relying on the technology to reach a specific destination.
Companies and individuals can take measures to protect against GPS spoofing, including using decoy antennae and keeping GPS-enabled equipment offline when connectivity is not necessary. Practicing good cyber hygiene can also help to protect against GPS spoofing.
Defining GPS spoofing
In short, the word “spoofing” means faking. With GPS spoofing, “fake” information is sent to a receiver while overriding the actual information.
GPS spoofing involves a radio transmitter near a target that interferes with the actual GPS signals being transmitted. GPS signals are often weak and transmitted through satellites. A stronger radio transmitter can be used to override the weaker signal and send illegitimate coordinates and information to the receiver.
GPS spoofing can then send people off course or say that someone is somewhere that they are not.
GPS is one of the global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) used in the world. Along with delivering location information, it is also used to keep accurate time. These functions can also be disrupted through spoofing or jamming.
Impacting businesses and individuals alike, GPS spoofing can interfere with smartphone apps and location data as well as involve cyberattacks on network systems and critical infrastructure that relies on GPS data.
How does GPS spoofing work?
The U.S. GPS system is made up of 31 satellites known as Navstaropens in a new tab that broadcast PRN codes to both civilians and the U.S. military. The codes sent to the military are encrypted. Civilian PRN codes are not and are published in public databases. This makes them vulnerable to cyberattack.
A hacker will first determine which of the GPS satellites will be nearby based on its orbit. From there, the hacker will then use the public PRN code to make a new code for each satellite. These signals are broadcast to the nearby satellites and gradually increased in strength until the receiver grabs hold of the spoofed codes. The attacker can then input false coordinates to the receiver.
Different types of GPS spoofing
GPS spoofing sends false data to a receiver to divert traffic, goods, or people with falsified information. When done on a large scale, such as by a state-sponsored actor, GPS spoofing can involve expensive equipment and expert operators.
Russia, for example, has potentially engaged in nearly 10,000 spoofing casesopens in a new tab, sending out false location data to civilian ships, to prevent drones from approaching President Putin and to safeguard sensitive sites. This type of spoofing involves equipment capable of sending spoofing signals potentially 500 times stronger than the authentic GNSS.
GPS spoofing can also be done with commercially available, cheap, and portable equipment too, including using software-defined radios running open-source software. With this type of spoofing, a broadcast antenna is used to point at a target’s GPS receiver to override the GPS signals provided by nearby buildings, aircraft, or ships.
Spoofing devices can also be carried onto airplanes by a passenger or deployed by a drone. These devices are small and handheld, inexpensive, and can be used very close to a target.
Cyberattacks are also possible forms of GPS spoofing, often involving smartphone apps that interfere with the phone’s legitimate location data.
The harms of GPS spoofing
GPS spoofing can be detrimental for both companies and individuals alike. Potential issues can have global implications. Some of the industries most vulnerable to GPS spoofing include shipping companies, construction companies, and rideshare and taxi companies.
These are some hazards of GPS spoofing:
- Misdirecting cargo shipments to alternate locations to steal the shipments: Often, shippers use GPS-enabled locks to ensure that they are only opened when they reach their destination, but GPS spoofing can unlock these.
- Hijacking a boat for piracy purposes: This can include large cargo ships, cruise ships, yachts, and private boats that rely on GPS coordinates to navigate the seas.
- Interfering with GPS at airports: This can cause a plane to go off course or have to attempt a “blind” landing, putting everyone on board at risk.
- Moving assets from construction sites: Construction equipment is often expensive and involves high-value items that are protected through GPS asset tracking systems. These systems can be spoofed to send equipment to false locations where it is stolen.
- Taxi and rideshare operators falsifying locations for profit: Ride share apps often rely on “surge” pricing during peak times, and drivers can use GPS spoofing to place themselves in these locations for financial gain. It can also allow them to incorrectly report their location in order to commit criminal acts while on the clock.
- Sending people on “fake” dates: Dating apps are commonly used to set up dates, and GPS spoofing can send a potential date into a dangerous location or into the hands of a predator.
- Misdirecting cars: Drivers and cars often use GPS to reach a destination. When this information is spoofed, they can be sent off course. This is especially concerning when considering the vulnerability of fully autonomous self-driving cars.
- Disrupting the universal time source: Financial companies, power utilities, and telecommunication companies all use the GNSS universal time source. If this is spoofed, it has the potential to crash financial markets, cause power blackouts, and disrupt the communication grid.
- Disrupting services through mobile apps and websites: Location data is used by many of these sites and apps to verify customer identities. When spoofed, it can give false information and deny someone access.
Ways to protect against GPS spoofing
Companies can use a variety of techniques to protect against GPS spoofing, including cryptography, direction-of-arrival sensing, and signal distortion detection.
- Cryptography: With cryptography, organizations encrypt the satellite codes coming and going. Only those with access to these codes can read the coordinates. This is similar to the way military encryption works.
This is not always an effective method on its own in the civilian sector, however, since it requires distribution of the “key” to unlock the encrypted data. Since that key has to be widely distributed, it is therefore vulnerable to hackers.
- Direction-of-arrival sensing: Spoofers are typically in one static place when attempting an attack, which means that the false signals they send are coming from only one place. This can be spotted through direction-of-arrival sensing since legitimate GSP data is transmitted from multiple satellites at once.
- Signal distortion detection: This method involves the addition of more signal-processing channels and hardware that can track the signal’s amplitude profile with a higher level of accuracy.
When a GPS signal is spoofed, it will initially send both the original signal and the false one, which can create a small “blip.” If this can be detected at the beginning of the spoof before the original signal is dropped off and the “drag off” to the false one has occurred, the attack can potentially be stopped.
The Department of Homeland Securityopens in a new tab (DHS) provides the following tips for protecting businesses against GPS or GNSS spoofing attacks:
- Obscure or hide your real antennas. Make sure they are not visible to the public by installing barriers or putting them in a place where they will not be seen.
- Choose the location of your antennas carefully. They will need a clear view of the sky, but it can be wise to ensure that they are blocked from public locations and nearby buildings.
- Install decoy antennas. Make these antennas clearly visible and put them at least 300 meters away from your real ones.
- Add redundant antennas. Having more than one antenna in a slightly different location can help companies to spot potential issues quickly.
- Use blocking antennas. These work to protect against jamming and interference. They can also lower the risk for spoofing attacks.
- Use backups. Inertial sensors can help to determine actual position and cesium, or rubidium clocks can work as backup timing systems when GPS is down. Backup systems that do not rely on GPS are helpful in the event of an issue.
- Practice good cyber hygiene. When not needed for network connectivity, GPS receivers and associated equipment should be kept offline. Two-factor authentication should be in place, passwords changed often, and updates and patches installed regularly. Virus protection, firewalls, and cyber defense practices should all be implemented.
Benefits of GPS spoofing
While GPS spoofing does create a lot of potential risks and vulnerabilities to consumers and businesses, it can also have some legitimate and beneficial purposes too.
GPS tracking involves location sharing, which can be a privacy concern. For this reason, GPS spoofing techniques can be used to hide the actual location of a person or product. There are many GPS spoofing apps and products on the market for just this purpose.
GPS spoofing is also used by security companies wishing to protect high-value targets or individuals. Spoofing techniques are regularly used by consumers who wish to “trick” a system into thinking they are somewhere where they are not, such as in the case of location-based smartphone games and apps. These can often be downloaded for free from the app store on a smartphone.
Additional resources
References
GPS Is Easy to Hack, and the U.S. Has No Backupopens in a new tab. (December 2019). Scientific American.
Russia ‘Spoofing’ GPS on Vast Scale to Stop Drones From Approaching Putin, Report Saysopens in a new tab. (March 2019). NBC News.
News Release: DHS Publishes Two Free Resources to Protect Critical Infrastructure From GPS Vulnerabilities.opens in a new tab (October 2021). Science and Technology Directorate.
Responsible Use of GPS for Critical Infrastructureopens in a new tab. (December 2017). Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI).
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Program.opens in a new tab (January 2022). Science and Technology Directorate.
GPS Receiver Whitelist Development Guideopens in a new tab. (July 2021). U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
(How GPS jamming and spoofing affects ELDs
GPS Jamming
- What it does: A GPS jammer emits a radio signal that overpowers and blocks the weak signals from GPS satellites. This causes the ELD’s location tracking to go offline.
- How it creates false logs: An ELD without a GPS signal is unable to accurately track a truck’s movement. In the event of a lost GPS signal, a driver may be able to manually log their status as “off-duty” or “sleeper berth” while still driving, enabling them to exceed their legal driving hours.
- The consequences: A loss of GPS signal is easily identified by roadside inspectors, who can issue out-of-service orders and require manual paper logs.
GPS Spoofing
- What it does: A GPS spoofer broadcasts a fake GPS signal to trick the ELD into thinking the truck is in a different location. According to freight data experts, spoofing can be done with fake ELD devices or apps found online.
- How it creates false logs: A driver or carrier can make it appear that a truck is parked at a terminal or at home while the driver is actually on the road. This allows drivers to hide excess driving time by making it look like they took a required break.
- The consequences: Some ELD data providers have identified cases of spoofed locations using corroborating video evidence. This activity can lead to severe penalties, including fines and criminal charges.
Other ELD manipulation tactics
While GPS manipulation is a major tactic, regulators have identified other methods used to falsify ELD data:
- Ghost drivers: Creating “dummy” driver accounts to assign driving hours and avoid violations.
- E-log forgery services: Organized, often foreign-based, services that offer 24/7 support to monitor and retroactively alter driver records.
- Altering logs via back-end access: Some carriers make edits to driver logs from a back office, and in some cases, without leaving an obvious record of the change.
- Unplugging devices: Drivers can simply unplug or deactivate the ELD to halt the recording of data.
- Improper use of “personal conveyance”: Drivers can incorrectly use the personal conveyance status—driving the vehicle for personal, non-work reasons—to mask excess driving hours.)
